II. To the Second Question

214. To the second question [n.208] I say that this science is not subaltern to any science, because although its subject is in some way under the subject of metaphysics, yet it does not receive any of its principles from metaphysics, because no theological property is demonstrable in metaphysics through the principles of being or through reasoning taken from the idea of being.

Nor does this science make any other science subaltern to it, because no other science takes from it its principles, for anything else in the genus of natural knowledge has its resolution ultimately to some immediate principles that are naturally known.

215. On the contrary: resolution does not stop at knowables unless the knowable is the most perfect, nor does it stop there unless that knowable is most perfectly known; line is more perfectly known in the Word than by way of its own movement; therefore the resolution of conclusions about line does not stop save at the quiddity of line, or at the principles about it, as these are seen in the Word. But that resolution is had by seeing the Word. Therefore the resolution of any conclusions and principles whatever stops at the vision of the Word. Therefore that vision makes the other knowledges, to all of which it gives evidence, subaltern to itself.

216. To this I reply that although a metaphysician who knows distinctly the quiddity of line or of whole may more perfectly know some immediate principle about line or about whole than a geometer does, who only knows line and whole confusedly, yet that immediate proposition is known per se to the geometer. Nor is his proof made through the metaphysician’s proposition, provided that the truth of the combination or connection of the terms is from his confused concept evident; the only thing is that the metaphysician has a more perfect knowledge of that same per se known truth; this would be all the more so if it was only through diverse motives that line was known from diverse things and from the side of the object with equal distinctness albeit not with equal clarity.

So it is in the proposed case. An immediate principle about line can be evident to an intellect that is moved by line, and more clearly evident to an intellect moved by the Word to knowledge of line as line is more clearly seen; yet a principle known in one way does not prove itself to be known in another way, but it is known ‘by itself’ in both ways, although more clearly thus or thus. But subalternation requires that the knowledge of the principles of the higher science be the cause of knowing the principles of the lower science,     etc .Interpolation: “This about theology in itself. But what about theology of the way? Would it be subalternate if such knowledge were to be given to someone or if it has been given? - To this some say [Aquinas, Henry of Ghent] that it is subalternate; for it is subalternate to the science of God and the blessed. - Against this it is argued first in this way: these people say elsewhere that science cannot stand with faith; but, as they say, because it is subalternate, it does stand with faith; therefore, according to them, it stands and does not stand, so they contradict themselves. - Besides, the science of God can only be single; therefore none can be subalternate. - Besides, science, according to the idea of its cause, depends only on the object or the subject or the light; but the vision of the blessed possesses no idea of cause with respect to the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore etc. - Besides, a subalternating science is not first about the same truths or the aforesaid known things, because a subalternated science begins there where the subalternating science ends; but this science can be of the same things as is the science of the blessed; therefore etc. -Besides, he who has the subalternated science is capable of having the subalternating science; in the proposed case neither of these is possible; therefore etc. The major is plain as to both parts: first, because he who has the principles about a conclusion can know the conclusion; the second is likewise plain, because the principles of the subalternating science are more universal and thus, in the order of intellectual cognition, they are known first, because there a second of this sort does not proceed from things more known but from sense. The minor is also plain as to both members: just as the wayfarer cannot see clearly, so neither can the blessed have sense.” ⁷²